BELLEVUE, WASHINGTON - My trip from Portland, Oregon to Seattle, Washington on Monday evening was one of the best of my trips over this portion of the "Amtrak Cascades" corridor. Arriving 16 minutes early, the trip took only 3 hours, 16 minutes, faster than the scheduled time time of three and a half hours for the corridor trains with Spanish-designed Talgo equipment.
This was my twenty-sixth trip over line between Seattle and Portland. My first trip was on Amtrak's now-defunct "Pioneer" (northbound train #25, which operated on the then-Burlington Northern as train #1798) on 24-June-1988. That train covered the 186.6 miles in 4 hours, 16 minutes for an average of 43.7 mph, sixteen minutes slower than scheduled.
My first trip on Talgo equipment occurred on 27-August-1994, when the original test set was running on the route as the "Northwest Talgo" on a trial basis. Southbound train #793 (#1793 to the Burlington Northern) handled the run in a time that would make even today's schedule, arriving 19 minutes early with a running time of 3 hours, 26 minutes and an average speed of 54.3 mph.
The slowest trip would not occur until 1-May-2006. On that day, I was on a late-running Coast Starlight train #14 (all Starlights were late in that era) that lost even more time on that segment because of severe freight train congestion at Willbridge in Portland. It took that train five hours, five minutes to cover the line, 40 minutes slower than scheduled, for a 36.7 mph average.
Four of the 26 trips have been on Amtrak Cascades train #508, the last train of the day (except when the Starlight is egregiously late) northbound out of Portland. On 9-February-2006, the train took 4 hours, 12 minutes to traverse the line (42 minutes slower than scheduled) mostly because of being held for a freight train at Clear Creek near Tacoma, Washington, and being briefly held while a car reported on the tracks was investigated in Seattle. On 8-May-2006, the run was similar, with a four hour running time (a half hour late) mostly because of a delay while the Columbia River Drawbridge was opened.
With freight traffic collapsed in the recession and the additional high-speed crossovers installed, it has been a very different experience this year. When I rode train #508 on 16-May-2009, it took only 3 hours, 12 minutes, arriving in Seattle 18 minutes early, the fastest I have ever experienced, a 58.3 mph average speed. With a few slow orders and crossing over between main tracks, my train on Monday didn't quite match that run, but was nearly as fast, being just four minutes slower for a very respectable average speed of 57.1 mph.
Those kinds of speeds are hardly considered high-speed, but they are competitive with driving and even flying (city center-to-city center), and the consistency shown this year represents the kind of reliability that makes corridor service attractive. If the rest of the Amtrak system were like the Cascades corridor, there would be a different attitude about rail transportation in general and Amtrak in particular in this country.
Showing posts with label Amtrak. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Amtrak. Show all posts
Friday, December 18, 2009
Friday, May 29, 2009
Transport: My First Amtrak Derailment
WARE, MASSACHUSETTS - I've been on board a train that derailed before. The most dramatic incident was a special Massachusetts Bay Railroad Enthusiasts Excursion in fall 2003 on the Washington County Railroad near Fairlee, Vermont. Running along the Connecticut River at a speed near 25 mph, passengers on "The Dartmouth" excursion suddenly felt vibrations not unlike an earthquake after a rail either spread or turned over after the passage of the locomotives on the normally freight-only line. The engineer was immediately advised by the conductor of the situation and brought the train to a safe halt. My car was leaning substantially toward the river, but was not in any actual danger of moving any farther, and nobody was injured in the incident. Passengers were bussed back to White River Junction, and the excursion was re-run successfully in the spring of 2005.
However, before today, I had never been on a normally-scheduled Amtrak train that derailed. After taking a VIA Rail Canada corridor train from Ottawa to Montreal to start the day (a train that averaged 58 mph, including stops, for its 115 mile journey), I left Montreal on Amtrak train #70, the "Adirondack," operated as far as the United States-Canada border by VIA crews on track owned by Canadian National. It had been a slow trip after departing on time, with dispatching issues and slow orders placing the train nearly a half hour behind schedule as we approached the border.
Not even one mile into the United States, before reaching the junction with the Canadian Pacific line that would take us to Schenectady, New York, and short of the location where United States Customs and Immigration would normally inspect the train, we were operating in yard limits at less than 10 miles per hour when I didn't like what I had just heard or felt. I thought I heard a noise like a wheel falling off a rail and felt too rough of a ride. After a few more feet, the engineer stopped the train.
On the radio, he said, "Head end to #70, I think you need to walk the train." "Why?" "You'll see." Sure enough, when the conductor walked the train, he found that three of the five cars in the train were at least partially off the rails, and reminiscent of the "Dartmouth" incident, my car had all of its left wheels off the track and was leaning noticeably, though not enough to require evacuating the car. As soon as a derailment was verified, I knew that my train ride for the day was over. In general, when wheel sets touch the ground, they have to be replaced before the car can return to revenue service, so this train wasn't going anywhere, at least with passengers on board.
Customs and Immigrations agreed to walk about a quarter-mile to clear the train where derailment had occurred. In the meantime, the crew announced a "mechanical failure with the train" (I'd say it was a mechanical failure of the track) and scrambled to deal with situation. Buses were called, then upon arrival refused to run up the access road to where the train was located, instead staying at the Rouses Point, New York station. By the time the crew improvised, carrying luggage on railroad pickup trucks while most passengers walked the quarter-mile to the buses, we had spent nearly four hours in Rouses Point.
Despite the delay, the direct run on the buses to Albany-Rensselaer where through passengers would be placed on a train again nearly made us on schedule again. The crew with the exception of the lounge car attendant (and I'm being charitable to her by leaving it at that) clearly tried hard to minimize the disruption as a result of the incident, and I give the conductor particular credit for his coordination efforts; he was so busy I never got a chance to ask his name. Ultimately, the blame for the derailment has to fall on Canadian National for not maintaining their tracks well enough to handle a passenger train traveling at less than 10 mph.
It certainly was not just another routine day on the railroad.
However, before today, I had never been on a normally-scheduled Amtrak train that derailed. After taking a VIA Rail Canada corridor train from Ottawa to Montreal to start the day (a train that averaged 58 mph, including stops, for its 115 mile journey), I left Montreal on Amtrak train #70, the "Adirondack," operated as far as the United States-Canada border by VIA crews on track owned by Canadian National. It had been a slow trip after departing on time, with dispatching issues and slow orders placing the train nearly a half hour behind schedule as we approached the border.
Not even one mile into the United States, before reaching the junction with the Canadian Pacific line that would take us to Schenectady, New York, and short of the location where United States Customs and Immigration would normally inspect the train, we were operating in yard limits at less than 10 miles per hour when I didn't like what I had just heard or felt. I thought I heard a noise like a wheel falling off a rail and felt too rough of a ride. After a few more feet, the engineer stopped the train.
On the radio, he said, "Head end to #70, I think you need to walk the train." "Why?" "You'll see." Sure enough, when the conductor walked the train, he found that three of the five cars in the train were at least partially off the rails, and reminiscent of the "Dartmouth" incident, my car had all of its left wheels off the track and was leaning noticeably, though not enough to require evacuating the car. As soon as a derailment was verified, I knew that my train ride for the day was over. In general, when wheel sets touch the ground, they have to be replaced before the car can return to revenue service, so this train wasn't going anywhere, at least with passengers on board.
Customs and Immigrations agreed to walk about a quarter-mile to clear the train where derailment had occurred. In the meantime, the crew announced a "mechanical failure with the train" (I'd say it was a mechanical failure of the track) and scrambled to deal with situation. Buses were called, then upon arrival refused to run up the access road to where the train was located, instead staying at the Rouses Point, New York station. By the time the crew improvised, carrying luggage on railroad pickup trucks while most passengers walked the quarter-mile to the buses, we had spent nearly four hours in Rouses Point.
Despite the delay, the direct run on the buses to Albany-Rensselaer where through passengers would be placed on a train again nearly made us on schedule again. The crew with the exception of the lounge car attendant (and I'm being charitable to her by leaving it at that) clearly tried hard to minimize the disruption as a result of the incident, and I give the conductor particular credit for his coordination efforts; he was so busy I never got a chance to ask his name. Ultimately, the blame for the derailment has to fall on Canadian National for not maintaining their tracks well enough to handle a passenger train traveling at less than 10 mph.
It certainly was not just another routine day on the railroad.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Transport: Remembering Buffy the Train Slayer
TORONTO, ONTARIO - Three years ago almost to the day, I took Amtrak's Coast Starlight on an overnight trip from Seattle, Washington to San Jose, California. In that era before the economy started to slow down, the Starlight was known for being consistently late, in large part because of congestion caused by freight train traffic. This trip would prove the most delayed of any I had ever taken on the Starlight before or since, and a major reason was someone called "Buffy the Train Slayer."
There were actually many reasons that the Coast Starlight was delayed during that era. The railroad lines used by the train south of Portland, Oregon were historically owned by the Southern Pacific which merged into the Union Pacific in 1996. The UP integration of the SP was extremely problem-prone, some related to deferred maintenance under the SP, some simply related to high traffic volumes and other, more normal factors. Even ten years later, the UP was playing catch-up. The highest-volume lines had been prioritized for upgrading and repairs, and the line plied by the Coast Starlight was not one of them. At one point in 2006, there were four hours of "slow orders" on the Starlight route, or speed restrictions on tracks that required passing over them at lower speed than normal for safety reasons. With four hours of lost time, there was no chance of running on time, even if no other delays were encountered, even accounting for slack in the schedule--there wasn't four hours of slack.
Usually, though, there were other delays. Some were Amtrak's own fault because of inadequate maintenance, as a locomotive would fail or a car would have a problem and have to be set-out enroute, or a relief crew would not arrive as expected to meet a late train. However, the largest single factor was what Amtrak called "freight train interference." On lines owned by freight railroads, such as nearly the entire route of the Coast Starlight, the freight railroad controlled dispatching and decided which trains would get to go first. In early 2006, there were more freight trains than Union Pacific could really run on the Sacramento to Portland portion of the Coast Starlight route. It was a major headache for the train dispatchers that were trying to set up the routes for all the trains.
Some were more skilled than others, and a certain dispatcher that worked second trick (afternoons) on the "Dispatcher 68" desk that controlled the line between Portland and Oakridge, Oregon gained a reputation for not getting trains over the road quickly. It wasn't just Amtrak crews and passengers that noticed. Freight crews didn't reach their destinations within their hours of service mandated by Federal law and had to be relieved frequently. Track maintainers became frustrated with the dispatcher with initials "SKR" since they couldn't get time on the track to make repairs. The situation became so famous that it began to be written about on-line and known worldwide.
In one particularly egregious incident, an Amtrak Cascades train from Eugene to Portland, Oregon took six hours to go the approximately fifty miles between Salem and Portland scheduled for not much more than one hour. Railroad enthusiast John Bauer happened to be on board that train and like many people had gone to the bistro car to pass the time while the train wasn't moving. Someone there asked the conductor what was going on, and he said something about the dispatcher really "stabbing" the train. As Bauer told the story:
I had never experienced "Buffy" before the trip three years ago, but I wouldn't soon forget. The train had encountered heavy freight train traffic on the BNSF Railway between Seattle and Portland, but still left Portland and entered "Buffy"'s territory only 3 minutes late. The first sign that all wasn't quite right should have come with a ten minute delay for a meet at a siding called Gervais, but on a busy railroad that isn't necessarily a big deal. When I first realized we were in trouble was when the dispatcher contacted our crew south of Salem to communicate two unforeseen speed restrictions and gave her initials as SKR in the process. I knew of "Buffy" and her reputation, and I now knew that my train's progress was at her mercy.
All still seemed reasonable until just we were stopped by a red signal just short of the Eugene station, running about a half hour late. Twenty minutes later, the northbound Coast Starlight pulled out of the station and we were allowed in. This seemed a bit odd, as the station stop at Eugene usually took ten minutes or less, and we proceeded to pull out of the station about an hour late. However, I didn't know what "Buffy" had in store for us next.
The next siding past Eugene station was Judkins, and there was a relatively short northbound freight in the siding. "Buffy" instructed us to back into the south end of the siding behind it. We followed the instructions and waited, with no indication of how long we would be there. In an hour, a northbound train passed, but we still didn't get a signal to proceed. Only after another twenty minutes passed and another train went by did we finally continue southbound, now more than two hours late. After two more bad meets, we finally left "Buffy"'s territory, about three hours late.
It didn't get better overnight, as we encountered the bulk of the "slow orders," but likely also faced more freight interference. This underscores the fact that while "Buffy" had become notorious, in many ways she was simply a reflection of Union Pacific policies at the time that did not prioritize Amtrak trains. She was basically doing her job as directed by Corridor Managers above her, in some sense the scapegoat for a situation she didn't really create.
The next day there were further delays, including the addition of a private car to the train at Oakland and a major delay while we had to wait to use a bottleneck section of track just north of San Jose while three shorter-distance passenger trains were allowed to run first. Final arrival in San Jose was seven hours, twenty minutes late for what should have been a twenty-four hour trip. It was the worst timekeeping I had ever experienced on Amtrak.
Things have changed in the past three years. "Buffy the Train Slayer" changed territories in late 2006 and no longer dispatches the Coast Starlight route in Oregon. Union Pacific has repaired the vast majority of the slow orders on the route. The economy has slowed and the number of freight trains on the route has decreased markedly. Most significantly, the Union Pacific now has a policy of trying to earn incentive payments from Amtrak and makes a real effort to run the trains on time. In 2008, I took three trips on the Coast Starlight, all of which reached their destinations on time or early. In February 2009, the Coast Starlight ran on-time 91% of the time, well above Amtrak's nationwide average and better by 10% than any airline. Less than a quarter of the delays were attributed to "freight train interference." It all makes "Buffy the Train Slayer" seem like a distant memory.
There were actually many reasons that the Coast Starlight was delayed during that era. The railroad lines used by the train south of Portland, Oregon were historically owned by the Southern Pacific which merged into the Union Pacific in 1996. The UP integration of the SP was extremely problem-prone, some related to deferred maintenance under the SP, some simply related to high traffic volumes and other, more normal factors. Even ten years later, the UP was playing catch-up. The highest-volume lines had been prioritized for upgrading and repairs, and the line plied by the Coast Starlight was not one of them. At one point in 2006, there were four hours of "slow orders" on the Starlight route, or speed restrictions on tracks that required passing over them at lower speed than normal for safety reasons. With four hours of lost time, there was no chance of running on time, even if no other delays were encountered, even accounting for slack in the schedule--there wasn't four hours of slack.
Usually, though, there were other delays. Some were Amtrak's own fault because of inadequate maintenance, as a locomotive would fail or a car would have a problem and have to be set-out enroute, or a relief crew would not arrive as expected to meet a late train. However, the largest single factor was what Amtrak called "freight train interference." On lines owned by freight railroads, such as nearly the entire route of the Coast Starlight, the freight railroad controlled dispatching and decided which trains would get to go first. In early 2006, there were more freight trains than Union Pacific could really run on the Sacramento to Portland portion of the Coast Starlight route. It was a major headache for the train dispatchers that were trying to set up the routes for all the trains.
Some were more skilled than others, and a certain dispatcher that worked second trick (afternoons) on the "Dispatcher 68" desk that controlled the line between Portland and Oakridge, Oregon gained a reputation for not getting trains over the road quickly. It wasn't just Amtrak crews and passengers that noticed. Freight crews didn't reach their destinations within their hours of service mandated by Federal law and had to be relieved frequently. Track maintainers became frustrated with the dispatcher with initials "SKR" since they couldn't get time on the track to make repairs. The situation became so famous that it began to be written about on-line and known worldwide.
In one particularly egregious incident, an Amtrak Cascades train from Eugene to Portland, Oregon took six hours to go the approximately fifty miles between Salem and Portland scheduled for not much more than one hour. Railroad enthusiast John Bauer happened to be on board that train and like many people had gone to the bistro car to pass the time while the train wasn't moving. Someone there asked the conductor what was going on, and he said something about the dispatcher really "stabbing" the train. As Bauer told the story:
Passengers took it from there with "What was that movie about a slayer?" "It was the Vampire something wasn't it?" "Yeah, that was Buffy the Vampire Slayer." "Well, how about this being Buffy the Train Slayer?"The name stuck. The dispatcher with initials SKR became known as "Buffy the Train Slayer" worldwide.
I had never experienced "Buffy" before the trip three years ago, but I wouldn't soon forget. The train had encountered heavy freight train traffic on the BNSF Railway between Seattle and Portland, but still left Portland and entered "Buffy"'s territory only 3 minutes late. The first sign that all wasn't quite right should have come with a ten minute delay for a meet at a siding called Gervais, but on a busy railroad that isn't necessarily a big deal. When I first realized we were in trouble was when the dispatcher contacted our crew south of Salem to communicate two unforeseen speed restrictions and gave her initials as SKR in the process. I knew of "Buffy" and her reputation, and I now knew that my train's progress was at her mercy.
All still seemed reasonable until just we were stopped by a red signal just short of the Eugene station, running about a half hour late. Twenty minutes later, the northbound Coast Starlight pulled out of the station and we were allowed in. This seemed a bit odd, as the station stop at Eugene usually took ten minutes or less, and we proceeded to pull out of the station about an hour late. However, I didn't know what "Buffy" had in store for us next.
The next siding past Eugene station was Judkins, and there was a relatively short northbound freight in the siding. "Buffy" instructed us to back into the south end of the siding behind it. We followed the instructions and waited, with no indication of how long we would be there. In an hour, a northbound train passed, but we still didn't get a signal to proceed. Only after another twenty minutes passed and another train went by did we finally continue southbound, now more than two hours late. After two more bad meets, we finally left "Buffy"'s territory, about three hours late.
It didn't get better overnight, as we encountered the bulk of the "slow orders," but likely also faced more freight interference. This underscores the fact that while "Buffy" had become notorious, in many ways she was simply a reflection of Union Pacific policies at the time that did not prioritize Amtrak trains. She was basically doing her job as directed by Corridor Managers above her, in some sense the scapegoat for a situation she didn't really create.
The next day there were further delays, including the addition of a private car to the train at Oakland and a major delay while we had to wait to use a bottleneck section of track just north of San Jose while three shorter-distance passenger trains were allowed to run first. Final arrival in San Jose was seven hours, twenty minutes late for what should have been a twenty-four hour trip. It was the worst timekeeping I had ever experienced on Amtrak.
Things have changed in the past three years. "Buffy the Train Slayer" changed territories in late 2006 and no longer dispatches the Coast Starlight route in Oregon. Union Pacific has repaired the vast majority of the slow orders on the route. The economy has slowed and the number of freight trains on the route has decreased markedly. Most significantly, the Union Pacific now has a policy of trying to earn incentive payments from Amtrak and makes a real effort to run the trains on time. In 2008, I took three trips on the Coast Starlight, all of which reached their destinations on time or early. In February 2009, the Coast Starlight ran on-time 91% of the time, well above Amtrak's nationwide average and better by 10% than any airline. Less than a quarter of the delays were attributed to "freight train interference." It all makes "Buffy the Train Slayer" seem like a distant memory.
Friday, November 14, 2008
Transport: Amtrak after Kummant
TORONTO, ONTARIO - Today, the resignation of Amtrak President and Chief Executive Officer Alex Kummant was announced--except that a prominent and respected source says that a "resignation" isn't exactly what happened. Especially unclear is whether the exit of Kummant, for whatever reason, provides any indication about the future of Amtrak, the only intercity rail passenger company in the United States.
Kummant had served as Amtrak President for about two years following the very political firing of widely-respected predecessor David Gunn in 2005. Gunn, who had earned wide acclaim for his previous work improving transit systems in New York and Toronto amongst other places, had been hired in 2002 to improve the operating efficiency of the railroad and generally improve Amtrak's standing with Congress and the Bush administration. While Gunn made significant progress in his goals, focusing on running a passenger railroad while ending an express business that interfered with passenger operations and angered host freight railroads, working on putting the equipment in a "state of good repair" and stabilizing the overall financial status of the railroad, he rapidly found himself at odds with an Amtrak board filled with George W. Bush administration appointees that wanted Amtrak to operate without a subsidy. In contrast, in a famous 2003 presentation about the "Six Myths of Amtrak," Gunn expressed his belief that Amtrak could never be profitable, that no other rail passenger system in the world was profitable, and that no transportation system in the world exists without significant subsidies of some kind. During Senate testimony, he challenged Amtrak opponent John McCain to let commuter airlines in the state of Arizona try to operate without subsidies to outlying areas. Eventually, the Amtrak board had enough of Gunn's perspective and he was fired in late 2005.
When Alex Kummant was hired to be Amtrak president in the summer of 2006 after David Hughes had served as placeholder, it wasn't clear how he would approach the job. While Kummant had served in several vice-presidential positions at freight railroad and Amtrak host Union Pacific, he had since moved on to construction and mining equipment. He would still dealing with the same Amtrak board, but in a significant change, he would no longer be dealing with a Republican Congress intent on "reform" (read privatization of Amtrak). The Democrats moved into control of both houses of Congress within months of the start of Kummant's tenure, meaning that Amtrak's subsidy was much more secure. While President Bush threatened to veto Amtrak funding, in the end the subsidy would be included in some other bill that Bush did not dare veto and the railroad could at least live on.
The board still wanted to "reform" Amtrak, however. A ban on new routes, imposed during Gunn's tenure in exchange for a government loan that kept Amtrak running during a funding crisis, remained in effect. The board wanted to avoid subsidizing "cruise" passengers, so for a time the number of sleeping cars had to be reduced on some long-distance trains even if they were available and could have been sold out. Money spent on "amenities" had to be reduced, resulting in the implementation of a less-than-popular "Diner Lite" service on many long-distance trains in which much less actual cooking was done on-board the trains and millions of dollars were spent re-configuring dining cars for the new-style service. In an attempt to save money through making operations more uniform, standardized consists were introduced on the Northeast Corridor, instead of changing train length based on demand, and through coaches and a sleeper between Boston and Chicago were eliminated to avoid switching a train at Albany, New York.
Furthermore, even improvements that were attempted under Kummant just didn't seem to be implemented very well. The re-launch of the premium service on the long-distance train on the west coast, the Coast Starlight, was supposed to occur in June 2008, but many of the promised amenities simply weren't there when I rode the train on 21-June. Yet, they did materialize by the time I rode the train again on 25-October. A general feeling of lack of discipline seemed to permeate the entire railroad--a feeling that seemingly has been almost-continuously increasing since it took over passenger service in the United States in 1971.
Yet, despite the moves that were unpopular with rail advocates, it was clear that Kummant was at least trying to run a passenger railroad within the restrictions that he was given. Under Kummant, the reliability of the Acela trainsets in the Northeast Corridor increased considerably. State-supported corridor services, where states were willing to step up with increasing funding, increased in frequency, including in California, Illinois, and Washington. Service initiatives like the "re-launch" of the Coast Starlight have proceeded, even if their implementation has been somewhat lackluster. Most significantly, obviously driven by increased gas and airline prices, ridership has been rising. 28.7 million passengers rode Amtrak in the fiscal year ending on 31-October-2008, more than a 12% increase from the previous year--and increases were seen all over the system, not just in expanding corridors.
So why did Kummant resign? Railway Age has reported that Amtrak spokesperson Clifford Black stated "differences in strategies, direction, and management philosophy" with the board were behind the resignation. Respected long-time transportation reporter Don Phillips, now of Trains magazine, has reported that Kummant has been feuding with Chairman of the Board Donna McLean over debt restructuring. Phillips characterized the dispute as an "arcane budget matter," but it was apparently enough that "Kummant agreed to walk away and not bring the clash before Congress in exchange for being allowed to characterize the departure as a resignation, not a firing."
In time, the exact nature of the dispute will likely come out, but it seems hard to believe that an "arcane budget matter" would be worth bringing to the attention of Congress or resigning over unless it made a real difference to the future of the railroad. While Kummant himself has been accused of being a Bush administration tool, Donna McLean is definitely a Bush follower. After serving various transportation roles in the Reagan and both Bush administrations, McLean was nominated to a five-year term on the Amtrak board in 2006. While her nominating statement was far from inflammatory, her history implies that she would be in favor of the radical reform agenda espoused by Republicans. It seems entirely plausible that Kummant--like Gunn before him, fundamentally coming from the perspective of trying to operate a railroad--may have thought that the "debt restructuring" pushed by McLean and the board would in some way hinder either the operation or future expansion of Amtrak.
More interestingly, regardless of the viewpoint of the McLean, the makeup of the Amtrak board is likely to change radically in the coming months. A nominally seven-person board, it presently has only five members: McLean, Hunter Biden, Thomas Carper, Nancy Naples, and Mary Peters. McLean, Peters, and Naples are relatively-recent Republican appointees who will remain on the board for some years, while Biden (the vice-president-elect's son) and Carper are Democrats. Besides the two presently-open seats, the board will be expanding by two additional members in April under legislation signed by President Bush last month, so there are effectively four openings. By May, the Amtrak board may have a Democratic majority.
Furthermore, vice-president-elect Joseph Biden is well-known for riding Amtrak regularly between Wilmington, Delaware and Washington, D.C., and has long been a rail transportation advocate. With his influence in the White House, his son on the Amtrak Board, and a Democrat-controlled Congress, it seems likely that Amtrak will not be struggling for its very existence for at least the next two years.
The big question is not whether Amtrak will survive in its present form, but whether it will be able to turn around its deteriorating operations, equipment and on-board attitude and actually become a real and attractive alternative in the US transportation system outside of a few limited corridors. Alex Kummant's successor may not have to worry about his company's existence, but he or she will still have a very hard job to do.
Kummant had served as Amtrak President for about two years following the very political firing of widely-respected predecessor David Gunn in 2005. Gunn, who had earned wide acclaim for his previous work improving transit systems in New York and Toronto amongst other places, had been hired in 2002 to improve the operating efficiency of the railroad and generally improve Amtrak's standing with Congress and the Bush administration. While Gunn made significant progress in his goals, focusing on running a passenger railroad while ending an express business that interfered with passenger operations and angered host freight railroads, working on putting the equipment in a "state of good repair" and stabilizing the overall financial status of the railroad, he rapidly found himself at odds with an Amtrak board filled with George W. Bush administration appointees that wanted Amtrak to operate without a subsidy. In contrast, in a famous 2003 presentation about the "Six Myths of Amtrak," Gunn expressed his belief that Amtrak could never be profitable, that no other rail passenger system in the world was profitable, and that no transportation system in the world exists without significant subsidies of some kind. During Senate testimony, he challenged Amtrak opponent John McCain to let commuter airlines in the state of Arizona try to operate without subsidies to outlying areas. Eventually, the Amtrak board had enough of Gunn's perspective and he was fired in late 2005.
When Alex Kummant was hired to be Amtrak president in the summer of 2006 after David Hughes had served as placeholder, it wasn't clear how he would approach the job. While Kummant had served in several vice-presidential positions at freight railroad and Amtrak host Union Pacific, he had since moved on to construction and mining equipment. He would still dealing with the same Amtrak board, but in a significant change, he would no longer be dealing with a Republican Congress intent on "reform" (read privatization of Amtrak). The Democrats moved into control of both houses of Congress within months of the start of Kummant's tenure, meaning that Amtrak's subsidy was much more secure. While President Bush threatened to veto Amtrak funding, in the end the subsidy would be included in some other bill that Bush did not dare veto and the railroad could at least live on.
The board still wanted to "reform" Amtrak, however. A ban on new routes, imposed during Gunn's tenure in exchange for a government loan that kept Amtrak running during a funding crisis, remained in effect. The board wanted to avoid subsidizing "cruise" passengers, so for a time the number of sleeping cars had to be reduced on some long-distance trains even if they were available and could have been sold out. Money spent on "amenities" had to be reduced, resulting in the implementation of a less-than-popular "Diner Lite" service on many long-distance trains in which much less actual cooking was done on-board the trains and millions of dollars were spent re-configuring dining cars for the new-style service. In an attempt to save money through making operations more uniform, standardized consists were introduced on the Northeast Corridor, instead of changing train length based on demand, and through coaches and a sleeper between Boston and Chicago were eliminated to avoid switching a train at Albany, New York.
Furthermore, even improvements that were attempted under Kummant just didn't seem to be implemented very well. The re-launch of the premium service on the long-distance train on the west coast, the Coast Starlight, was supposed to occur in June 2008, but many of the promised amenities simply weren't there when I rode the train on 21-June. Yet, they did materialize by the time I rode the train again on 25-October. A general feeling of lack of discipline seemed to permeate the entire railroad--a feeling that seemingly has been almost-continuously increasing since it took over passenger service in the United States in 1971.
Yet, despite the moves that were unpopular with rail advocates, it was clear that Kummant was at least trying to run a passenger railroad within the restrictions that he was given. Under Kummant, the reliability of the Acela trainsets in the Northeast Corridor increased considerably. State-supported corridor services, where states were willing to step up with increasing funding, increased in frequency, including in California, Illinois, and Washington. Service initiatives like the "re-launch" of the Coast Starlight have proceeded, even if their implementation has been somewhat lackluster. Most significantly, obviously driven by increased gas and airline prices, ridership has been rising. 28.7 million passengers rode Amtrak in the fiscal year ending on 31-October-2008, more than a 12% increase from the previous year--and increases were seen all over the system, not just in expanding corridors.
So why did Kummant resign? Railway Age has reported that Amtrak spokesperson Clifford Black stated "differences in strategies, direction, and management philosophy" with the board were behind the resignation. Respected long-time transportation reporter Don Phillips, now of Trains magazine, has reported that Kummant has been feuding with Chairman of the Board Donna McLean over debt restructuring. Phillips characterized the dispute as an "arcane budget matter," but it was apparently enough that "Kummant agreed to walk away and not bring the clash before Congress in exchange for being allowed to characterize the departure as a resignation, not a firing."
In time, the exact nature of the dispute will likely come out, but it seems hard to believe that an "arcane budget matter" would be worth bringing to the attention of Congress or resigning over unless it made a real difference to the future of the railroad. While Kummant himself has been accused of being a Bush administration tool, Donna McLean is definitely a Bush follower. After serving various transportation roles in the Reagan and both Bush administrations, McLean was nominated to a five-year term on the Amtrak board in 2006. While her nominating statement was far from inflammatory, her history implies that she would be in favor of the radical reform agenda espoused by Republicans. It seems entirely plausible that Kummant--like Gunn before him, fundamentally coming from the perspective of trying to operate a railroad--may have thought that the "debt restructuring" pushed by McLean and the board would in some way hinder either the operation or future expansion of Amtrak.
More interestingly, regardless of the viewpoint of the McLean, the makeup of the Amtrak board is likely to change radically in the coming months. A nominally seven-person board, it presently has only five members: McLean, Hunter Biden, Thomas Carper, Nancy Naples, and Mary Peters. McLean, Peters, and Naples are relatively-recent Republican appointees who will remain on the board for some years, while Biden (the vice-president-elect's son) and Carper are Democrats. Besides the two presently-open seats, the board will be expanding by two additional members in April under legislation signed by President Bush last month, so there are effectively four openings. By May, the Amtrak board may have a Democratic majority.
Furthermore, vice-president-elect Joseph Biden is well-known for riding Amtrak regularly between Wilmington, Delaware and Washington, D.C., and has long been a rail transportation advocate. With his influence in the White House, his son on the Amtrak Board, and a Democrat-controlled Congress, it seems likely that Amtrak will not be struggling for its very existence for at least the next two years.
The big question is not whether Amtrak will survive in its present form, but whether it will be able to turn around its deteriorating operations, equipment and on-board attitude and actually become a real and attractive alternative in the US transportation system outside of a few limited corridors. Alex Kummant's successor may not have to worry about his company's existence, but he or she will still have a very hard job to do.
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